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Abstract
Politicians seeking reelection need voters to know what they have done for them.
Thus, incentives may arise to spend more money where media coverage is higher.
We present a simple model to explain the allocation of public spending across ju-
risdictions contingent on media activity. An incumbent seeking to maximize the
probability of reelection will shift more money to jurisdictions where an extra dol-
lar gains more votes because a larger share of the electorate is informed about his
policy. This prediction is tested using US data on county-level public spending,
Designated Market Areas (DMAs) and location of licensed television stations. In-
strumenting for the possible endogeneity of media activity to public spending, 2SLS
results confirm a positive effect of media coverage on county-level public spending.
Spatial regression rules out the possibility of confounding media effects with spatial
autocorrelation.
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1 Introduction
Every year US politics channels hundreds of billions of federal grant dollars to states
and local jurisdictions. Political economics suggests that the distribution of grants is
affected by incumbent politicians’ behavior which in turn is driven by the aim of winning
reelection. Indeed, a recent quote from Senator Clinton points out that politicians believe
one of their primary tasks to be bringing money to their districts: “I’m very proud of my
earmarks [grants]. It’s one of the reasons I won 67 percent of the vote, because I took care
of my people.”1 But will they care equally for all voters in the electorate or do incentives
exist which may induce them to bias their effort in favor of certain groups of voters?
The quote from Senator Clinton indicates that politicians assume voters to follow a retro-
spective voting strategy asking “What have you done for me lately?” when casting their
ballot, as argued by Popkin (1991). Consequently, information plays an important role
because only voters who know that an incumbent is responsible for some benefit consider
this when going to the polls. If politicians know that some voters are better informed,
these voters may receive favorable policies. This leads to the crucial questions of how
voters obtain their information and why some voters are informed whereas others are not.
There are many ways in which people may obtain information. For example, information
may be conveyed in daily life by talking to neighbors and friends. Today, however, the
main sources of information are media like the internet, newspapers and television. As
they are considered to be the primary source of information for most U.S. citizens (Napoli
and Yan, 2007), this paper examines local TV news. TV stations which broadcast local
news for a given market tend to cluster together in few places (media cities). As to that,
Adams (1980) finds that local news coverage is biased in favor of regions close to the
media cities, leaving large areas of a market with only little attention. This finding is
in line with recent work by sociologists indicating that the proximity of events to media
outlets makes coverage more likely (Kaniss, 1997; Oliver and Myers, 1999). In this paper,
we examine whether this stylized fact of US television markets affects public policies.
In a simple model we show that news programs may be biased in favor of places close
to media cities because reporting from these locations is less expensive. Thus, the model
predicts that voters in counties close to media cities are better informed about public
policies and receive more money. We test this prediction empirically using U.S. data on
county-level grant spending, Designated Market Areas (DMAs) and location of licensed
television stations. DMAs are the current industry standard for defining television markets
in the United States. We show that the proposed media variables significantly affect the
geographical distribution of grant spending, as predicted by the theoretical model. These
results are robust to correcting for endogeneity and spatial correlation.
1 Mike Wereschagin, David Brown and Salena Zito, “Clinton: Wright would not have been
my pastor”, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, March 25, 2008, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/s_558930.html.
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This paper contributes to the growing field in political economics that explores the impact
of mass media on political outcomes. The closest connection is to the work by Stro¨mberg
(2004a,b) which analyzes the influence of media on fiscal policy. Stro¨mberg (2004a) ex-
amines competition between media outlets and identifies incentives leading mass media to
bias programs in favor of certain groups. His theoretical model predicts media to report
more on issues concerning large groups, groups that are more attractive to advertising,
groups that attach a higher value to information and groups which are easier to reach in
terms of distributing news. In the model these groups are better informed which results
in favorable policies towards them. Stro¨mberg (2004b) tests empirically whether better
informed voters receive favorable policies. He uses U.S. data on county-level spending by
FERA, a major New Deal program in the 1930s, and approximates the share of informed
voters by the share of households owning a radio. He finds that counties with a larger
share of these households received more funds.
Our analysis complements Stro¨mberg’s by considering the costs of producing news. News
media have to gather costly information in order to create coverage. If the cost of collect-
ing information differs among potentially newsworthy events, this may divert resources
to less costly reporting and thus introduce a bias in coverage driven by the cost side. We
argue that the cost of gathering information increases with distance to media cities. This
introduces an effect on news coverage that counteracts Stro¨mberg´s argument regarding
distribution cost. He argues that broadcast media face significantly lower costs of dis-
tributing news to distant regions than newspapers. Thus, the rise of radio and television
may result in paying more attention remote areas. Yet, whenever information from these
jurisdictions comes at a higher price, this will produce an effect opposite to Stro¨mberg’s.
In a different context Besley and Burgess (2002) apply an agency model to show that
better informed voters may be more successful in holding governments accountable. They
analyze panel data from India and find that state governments provide more public food
and calamity relief in hard times when newspaper circulation is higher. Newspaper cir-
culation is assumed to measure the share of informed voters.
We proceed as follows. While the next section presents the theoretical model, section 3
gives a description of the data and estimation approach. Empirical results are presented
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In order to study equilibrium spending levels in a retrospective voting model, we explain
the formation of two classes of voters, the informed and the uninformed. An incumbent
politician seeking reelection decides about the allocation of public funds among different
groups in the electorate. Let the politician be an incumbent US state governor and let
each group comprise the residents of a county within the state. We further assume that the
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state area is congruent with a television market and that there are two television stations
broadcasting news. These newscasts are the single source of information about politics
available to the individuals. We adapt the framework presented in Stro¨mberg (2004a) to
study how the costs of producing news affect news coverage of the TV stations.
To keep the model simple, we assume that coverage of the governor’s policies is ensured,
implying that all voters watching the news are informed about spending levels. However,
as an individual vote has virtually no influence on the electoral outcome, citizens consume
news for entertainment value only and learning about the governor is a by-product, i.e.
people care about what is going on in their community rather than about politics per se.
In the next section, we analyze air time allocation by two competing television stations,
given that on the demand side, viewers desire information on their county of residence.
The resulting number of viewers spotting some news in each county will then constitute the
respective groups of informed voters in the analysis of gubernatorial spending decisions.
2.1 Local TV News
In a television market, two commercial TV stations A and B compete for audience by
broadcasting local news. Each station allocates total air time N across counties c =
1, 2, ..., C such that
∑
c
nsc = N with n
s
c being news time devoted to a county c by station
s = A,B. Voters care about what is going on in their community, i.e. they are interested
only in news on their resident county. φ denotes the probability that a voter spots some
news on TV which increases in news time devoted to a county φ′(nc) > 0 with decreasing
marginal effect φ′′(nc) < 0, moreover φ′(0) = ∞. Thus, the expected utility of watching
news for a voter in county c is defined as uc(nc) = φ(nc) · u¯, where u¯ denotes the exogenous
utility derived from an interesting newscast. For simplicity, we assume that all voters
equally care for news on their home county implying that differences in expected utility
are due only to allocated news time. Finally, a voter picks station A if
uc(n
A
c )− uc(nBc ) ≥ ξi (1)
and station B otherwise. ξi denotes how voter i evaluates fixed characteristics of station
A relative to station B, e.g. sympathy for anchormen and the style of presenting news or
the ideological bias of a station. A positive value of ξi implies that voter i favors station
B whereas negative values indicate a bias in favor of station A, leaving news levels out
of consideration. This individual evaluation is given by the county-specific distribution
function Fc. For simplicity, we assume that Fc is the uniform distribution with support
[− 1
2fc
, 1
2fc
] and density fc. Consequently, a voter watches station A’ s newscasts with
probability Fc[uc(n
A
c )− uc(nBc )].
Now we turn to the cost of news production. Broadcast media like television face high
costs when it comes to producing programs for the first consumer whereas the marginal
costs of the following consumers are approximately zero. Once a signal is broadcast, no
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additional costs are incurred when more people consume the program. The main task of
journalists is gathering information to produce coverage. Being confronted with a larger
number of events taking place all over the market area, TV stations face higher costs of
collecting information in remote counties not only because it takes time and money to
get there but journalists located in close proximity to the TV station are also usually
better connected within networks generating easier access to contact persons and better
information about institutions (Kaniss, 1997). Hence, with both stations being situated
at the same place we presume marginal reporting costs kc to vary across counties equally
for stations A and B. Counties located far away from the media city feature high values
of kc whereas kc is lower for counties near the two stations.
Both stations maximize expected profits. As advertisers on local television usually are
less concerned with aiming at specific socio-demographic groups than advertisers in news-
papers (Kaniss, 1997) both stations simply strive to maximize their audience shares re-
gardless of audience composition. With revenues per viewer from advertising normalized
to one, station A maximizes expected profit
E[piA] =
∑
c
[
pc · Fc[uc(nAc )− uc(nBc )]− kc · nAc
]
(2)
subject to the air time constraint. pc denotes population in county c. Both stations decide
simultaneously and non-cooperatively about allocating news time across counties. As the
two stations face exactly the same optimization problem the unique Nash-Equilibrium has
both stations broadcasting the same news on each county in the market. Thus, equilibrium
news allocation is given by a pair of strategies (nA,nB) satisfying nAc = n
B
c = n
∗
c , the air
time constraint and
pcfcφ
′
c(n
∗
c)u¯− kc = λ, λ > 0, (3)
for all counties.2 Equation (3) summarizes the message of the model regarding news
time allocation in equilibrium n∗c = n
∗(kc, fc, pc, u¯) and implies that the marginal effect
of a news unit on expected profit must be equal across all counties. Assuming that the
distribution function Fc is the same for all counties, the model predicts that both stations
broadcast more news on counties where collecting information is less expensive and on
counties with larger population. As we argue that gathering information is less expensive
in places close to the location of the two stations this results in more coverage of counties
close to the stations whereas more distant counties are left with only little media attention.
2 Basically, the model of competition between the two television stations is analogous to models of
redistributive politics as introduced by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and extended by Dixit and
Londregan (1996). As the basic model has already attained textbook status (see, e.g., Persson
and Tabellini, 2000) we abstain from extensively proving uniqueness and existence of the Nash-
Equilibrium in this very simple setting. Dixit and Londregan (1996) or Stro¨mberg (2004a) clearly
characterize equilibrium strategies and give proof. With u strictly concave and assuming Fc[·] to be
the uniform distribution, the objective functions of both stations satisfy the concavity condition for
existence of equilibrium.
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Equilibrium news also define the share of informed voters φc(n
∗
c) in each county. Recalling
what the model predicts on equilibrium news allocation, the share of informed voters
decreases in counties’ distance from the TV stations and increases in a county‘s population.
Note that this describes the allocation of coverage in general. In the following, we assume
that there is always coverage of the activities of persons as prominent as governors, but,
due to the calculus of television, the share of citizens who are aware of this differs among
counties. Thus, in the next subsection, there are informed voters who know how much
money was allocated to their county by the governor whereas uninformed voters do not
attribute spending to the governor.
2.2 Strategic Allocation of Grants
In this section, we use a simple probabilistic voting model as in Stro¨mberg (2004b) to
show how an incumbent spreads a given budget strategically across counties to maximize
the probability of reelection. The incumbent wins the election if she gets more than half
of all votes cast. She allocates total grants G across the counties in her state such that∑
c
pc · gc = G, (4)
where gc denotes grants per capita in county c. Since each voter i in county c derives
utility Wc = Wc(gc) from grants and cares about ideological features of the incumbent
her total utility is
Wc(gc)− σi − δ, (5)
where σi is an individual ideological component and δ is the incumbent’s general popu-
larity in the electorate as a whole; both components are random variables and may be
positive or negative.
Now we can take our result on informed voters from the last subsection and put pieces
together. Only an informed voter i in county c knows that the incumbent is responsible
for the grant allocation and takes this into account when casting the ballot. Then, voter
i votes for the incumbent if her total utility under the incumbent’s regime has met some
minimum standard Wi:
αi ·Wc(gc)− σi − δ ≥ Wi (6)
and for the challenger otherwise. The dummy variable αi equals one if citizen i is informed
and zero if she is not informed. Hence, the probability that αi = 1 is given by the share
of informed voters φc.
We assume a special form of the utility function :
Wc(g) = sc · 1
1− ε · g
1−ε, (7)
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where ε > 0 captures the concavity of the utility function and the parameter sc affects the
marginal utility of an extra dollar of grants. Note that Wc is strictly concave with marginal
utility falling from ∞ toward 0 when g is increased from 0 toward ∞. Evidently, since a
higher sc raises W
′
c for a given g, the voters in a county with a higher sc are more responsive
to grant money regarding their voting decision. Thus, sc measures how important grants
are in relation to ideology.
To keep things simple we assume that σi +Wi has a county-specific uniform distribution
with mean mc and density ψc. The higher ψc, the larger is the number of swing voters in
the county. The number of votes for the incumbent in that county c is
Vc = pc
(
1
2
+ ψc(φc ·Wc −mc − δ)
)
(8)
Consequently, the incumbent wins the election if∑
c
Vc =
∑
c
pc
(
1
2
+ ψc(φc ·Wc −mc − δ)
)
≥ 1
2
∑
c
pc. (9)
Rearranging, we obtain the equivalent expression
1∑
c
pcψc
∑
c
pcψc(φc ·Wc −mc) ≥ δ. (10)
Apparently, for any allocation of grants it depends on the realization of the general popu-
larity shock, δ, whether (10) is satisfied and the incumbent wins the election. Contingent
on grant allocation the probability of reelection, P , is given by
P = Ω
 1∑
c
pcψc
∑
c
pcψc(φc ·Wc −mc)
 ,
where Ω denotes the distribution function of δ.
The incumbent strives to maximize the probability of being reelected by allocating grants
strategically across counties. In equilibrium, the optimal allocation of grants g∗ satisfies
the first-order condition
ψc · φc ·W ′(g∗c ) = µ, µ > 0 (11)
and the budget constraint. Equation (11) summarizes the central message of the model
regarding the incumbent’s incentives to allocate grants strategically: In equilibrium, the
number of votes gained by an extra dollar is equal across counties. Assume that the gov-
ernor allocates his budget equally across counties. Then, the marginal effect on expected
votes is larger in counties with higher values of ψc and φc. The only way to satisfy the
equilibrium condition is to raise spending levels in counties where the marginal effect is
large. With W (gc) strictly concave, raising spending levels pushes down the marginal
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effect on expected votes in the respective counties. Simultaneously, raising the amount of
grants in some counties implies lower spending levels in other counties due to the budget
constraint. Thus, W ′(gc) increases in the latter counties leading to equilibrium. Finally,
larger shares of informed voters (φc) and more swing voters (ψc) give rise to allocating
more grants to counties.
The share of informed voters, φc, results from the competition in the television market.
As φ∗c = φ(n
∗
c) and n
∗
c = n
∗(kc, fc, pc, u¯), the model predicts grant spending to be higher in
counties where media find it less cumbersome to gather information (low kc). This is the
main message of the model. Furthermore, the model predicts that equilibrium spending
is higher in counties with many swing voters (ψc), in counties with large populations (pc)
and where the relative importance of grants as against ideology is higher (sc).
In the next chapter, we outline our strategy of identifying effects on county spending
levels driven by television market geography. Analyzing data on U.S. television markets
and the allocation of federal grants across counties, we empirically check the theoretical
predictions.
3 Data and estimation approach
Having laid out the theoretical hypotheses, the remainder of the paper is concerned with
the empirical analysis of media impact on public spending. First, we give an outline of
the empirical specification and data sources used in the estimation. The results section
then discusses our findings.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
In the estimation we will be using a cross-section of counties across the 48 contiguous
states of the United States of America3.
The dependent variable chosen is the per capita amount of federal grants awarded to the
respective counties in 2000. Since we set out to discover how the intensity of media ac-
tivity shapes the spending decisions of politicians, we would ideally want to use spending
the geographical distribution of which is completely at the politician’s discretion as our
left-hand-side variable. Even though governors enjoy quite a bit of budgetary power, such
monies are hardly ever available to politicians. Quite the contrary, most grants are not
freely distributed across counties but are rather distributed according to formulas that
3 Grants to New York City counties are attributed to New York County (Manhattan) because the
dependent variable was not available for all five boroughs. Washington, D.C. is excluded from the
estimations as are counties that cannot be unambiguously assigned to a single media market. A
number of counties is omitted because of missing values, leaving us with 2934 observations (approx-
imately 94% of US counties) for the estimations.
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have been decided upon in the political process. Thus, one could easily arrive at the con-
clusion that funds are being distributed in some sort of ’just’ manner because there is a
formula that exactly determines the amount each jurisdiction is to receive. Such reasoning
does not take into account that before being channeled to final recipients many formula
grants typically pass through intermediary government levels or institutions. Here, politi-
cal actors may put pressure on bureaucrats to divert spending according to the politician’s
preferences. Among these political actors are senators and governors. We assume that
senators as well as governors are interested in maximizing the amount of federal dollars
awarded to their state and then distribute them so as to maximize the probability of
reelection. It is important, though, to realize that in addition to bureaucrats being influ-
enced by politicians when it comes to the distribution of formula grants, not all grants
are awarded via formulas and sometimes the formula merely marks the upper bound for
the amount of grants that a county can receive. This leaves at least part of the federal
grants at the discretion of politicians to distribute among their constituencies.
It can be argued, that aside from Governors and Senators influencing the distribution of
grants, there are are many other political actors who follow their own political agenda,
most notably members of Congress. From a theoretical view, it is expected that the
governor will favor media cities. The same rationale goes for members of Congress who
distribute monies, as their districts span more than a single county. For our purposes,
however, it does not even matter whether it is the governor/congressman who distributes
the money or Congress members who pull funds into their district. An explanation for
the latter mechanism would be if Congressmen hailing from media counties generate more
funds because they are subject to heavier media scrutiny and thus put more effort into
their political actions than their counterparts from non-media places. Both mechanisms
will favor media counties.
An argument backing our choice of outcome measure comes from Levitt and Snyder
(1997), who distinguish between low-variation and high-variation federal expenditure and
state that high-variation spending is more prone to manipulations by politicians and eas-
ier to claim credit for. High-variation spending is in essence defined as federal expenditure
net of direct transfers to individuals and government procurement contracts, leaving fed-
eral programs often administered by state and local governments for examination. This
definition is not far from the federal grants variable we are using, yet we choose to stick
with the more clear-cut definition of federal grants. Thus, in order to explain the differ-
ences in federal grants per capita across communities, we use the following OLS baseline
specification where we enter all left- and right-hand side variables but those defined as
shares and the population variables in natural logarithms:
gc = β0 + β1 · αc + β2 · γc + β3 · ψc + β4 · φc + β5 · kc + εc, (12)
where gc is the (log of) dollar amount of federal grants per capita awarded to county c.
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The share of informed voters in a community is accounted for by variables included in
vector φc. These are the key variables in determining whether there is a connection be-
tween the intensity of media coverage, voter information and the geographical distribution
of federal grant awards. As we have shown in the theoretical model, the politician will
direct grants towards counties that are closer to the media cities, as they generate more
media coverage than grants awarded to farther away counties. This is due to the fact
that the TV station reporting on projects financed through grant awards can do so at a
lower cost if the project is realized in the proximity of the station’s headquarters. Hence,
the first variable proxying for voter information is the (log of) distance from the county’s
population centroid to the nearest media center. Our definition of media centers is based
on the Designated Market Areas (DMAs) stipulated by Nielsen Media Research. The
United States is split up into 210 DMAs (shown in figure 1), which are made up of those
counties that tend to watch the same TV stations4. DMAs can cross state borders and
are named after the city or cities where most TV stations are located. Whenever there are
multiple cities of importance to the media market, they enter the DMA name (e.g. the
San Francisco DMA is called San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose). When this is the case,
our distance variable measures distance to the nearest city appearing in the DMA name.
The intuition behind this is that even though they may not constitute the largest agglom-
eration in the DMA, these places are classified as media cities and a politician’s activity
in these places will probably generate more attention than it would in other places. As
these distances vary a great deal across states and even DMAs, we use a relative distance
measure calculated as county c’s distance to media center divided by the average distance
of all counties included in the same DMA to their nearest media city. This seems rea-
sonable, as TV stations divide their news time among events occuring within their own
DMA5. We hypothesize the coefficient on the distance variable to bear a negative sign,
implying decreasing effects of distance on the amount of grants received (see the results
section for further discussion).
Though not explicitly modeled as a distance measure, the second variable in φc essentially
accounts for physical distance and thus transaction cost on behalf of media organizations,
too. It is the (log of) the number of full-service TV stations licensed in the county under
consideration. Aside from capturing zero distance to the nearest media outlet, it accounts
for effects of having multiple outlets at one’s disposal6. These full-service stations are
made up in large part of affiliates of the four big networks ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX plus
the PBS stations. There are a little over 700 entities which contain at least one fully
licensed station, compared to a about 340 media cities (Table 11 in the appendix contains
4 Thus changes in DMA affiliation actually do occur from time to time, whenever viewing habits in a
given county change.
5 We do not believe media coverage to be exclusive to within-DMA counties as there are outside-DMA
events that warrant coverage. Yet these are of such importance that coverage is not a choice and
thus the choice set is still made up of within-DMA counties only.
6 This variable is calculated as log(number of TV stations +1) in order to avoid generating many
missing values. The estimated coefficient β will therefore not represent an elasticity. β can be
transformed into an elasticity ε as follows: ε = β · [x/(x+ 1)], where x is the number of TV stations.
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Figure 1: DMAs and state borders
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detailed information on the distribution of TV stations across counties). We expect this
variable to be a predictor of federal grant spending, because having at least one media
outlet in the immediate vicinity will greatly increase chances of news being picked up on,
even without being a Nielsen media city. Obviously, all media center counties are host
to at least one TV station and so the log of distance and the log of the number of TV
stations are to some extent two measures for the same concept. Accordingly, we use the
two variables interchangeably as indicators of the availability of media outlets.
As quite a few DMAs cross state borders, we add the share of DMA population living in
the same state that county c belongs to and a dummy variable taking on value 1 if all
media cities in the DMA are located in another state than county c. The latter variable
(out-of-state) accounts for counties possibly being marginalized within their own DMA
information-wise, because they are not an important enough target group for TV stations7.
The share of DMA population living in the same state as county c could also measure
marginalization such that a smaller share means less media attention. It may, however,
also be a measure for yardstick competition, as will be discussed later. In addition, if
county c is not out-of-state (i.e. there is a media city that caters to county c’s needs) a
smaller share of DMA population living in the same state as c might lead to higher grants,
as media attention may be more “on the spot”. In an attempt to disentangle these effects,
we add an interaction of the two variables. Finally, the percentage of residents with at
least a bachelor’s degree is added as a control for informed voters.
Relative voter turnout in county c is measured in αc. As data on the number of persons
registered to vote could not be obtained at county-level, we calculate turnout as the
number of democratic and republican votes cast in the 1996 presidential election divided
by population of that year. We then divide this number by the average turnout in the
state county c is located in. The assumption inherent to this transformation is that the
governor’s choice set is made up of all counties in the state. A high voter density ψc is
believed to induce higher levels of funding as well. We measure voter mobility as the
number of times the majority in presidential elections in county c has shifted from 1980
to 19968.
Controls for financial needs of a county and its population as well as politico-economic
controls are included in vector kc. Hence, it measures the relative importance of federal
grants to different groups in the population, as well as the relative success of different
groups in acquiring federal grants through activities such as lobbying. The political
variables we include are distance to the state capital relative to all other counties in
the same state, the percentage of residents employed by the federal government and the
percentage of residents employed by state and local government. While distance from the
capital is believed to be negatively related to the ability to generate funds, e.g. due to
higher lobbying costs (Borck and Owing 2003), a high percentage of federal and other
7 In addition to having no media city in their state, only 16% of these counties have a TV station as
opposed to 24% of the in-state-counties.
8 The log of mobility is calculated as log(majority shifts +1) for the same reasons stated earlier.
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government employees supposedly leads to higher grants per capita. The latter variables
also account for “politician density”. What we mean by that is that there are differences in
how well counties are represented in the political process, leading to the well-represented
jurisdictions receiving more money. As we do not have data on the number of politicians
hailing from the respective counties, we assume that the percentage of residents employed
by federal, state and local governments in county c is highly correlated with the number
of political agents operating on behalf of county c.
We also include a number of controls to account for the distribution of grants on the
basis of formulas9. In addition to income, poverty rate, unemployment rate, share of
females, percentage of high school dropouts, county expenditure per capita, percentage
of population under 24 and bank deposits per capita, we also add the Herfindahl index of
ethnic fragmentation10, the ratio of mean to median income and the white percentage of
the population11. All OLS and 2SLS estimations allow for clustering of standard errors
by state and include population density and population as well as state dummies. Full
sample estimations also include an indicator for whether the county is classified as a
metropolitan/micropolitan area.
3.2 Omitted Variables and Endogeneity of TV Station Location
Even though in most settings one would like to make use of panel data for empirical
estimations in order to minimize omitted variable bias, there is one important reason why
we do not believe we would be able to identify the effects outlined in the model using
this kind of data. The problem lies in the absolute and relative stationarity of our two
key variables, respectively. Whereas the number of major TV stations licensed in a given
county shows at least some, however limited, variation over time, the distance a county is
located from the nearest media city is fixed. The only possible reasons for this distance to
actually change would be (a) if a new media city emerges or a former one is not granted
that status any longer or (b) if the DMA a county belongs to changes. Although (b)
sometimes happens, we believe the variation in the data will be insufficient to identify
any effects12. We are well aware of the limitations inherent to cross-sectional data, yet
try to counter these problems through the use of state effects and 2SLS.
An obvious candidate to be concerned about when it comes to endogeneity is the number
of TV stations. OLS estimates may be biased due to omitted variables that affect both the
9 For a list of variables these formulas may contain, see Randsell (2004). Most of them are highly
collinear with income, so we choose not to include all of them.
10 The index takes on values between 0 (if there were an infinite number of population groups) and 1,
where 0 indicates total ethnic heterogeneity and 1 indicates a completely homogenous population.
Alesina (1999) finds that fragmentation leads to higher intergovernmental spending.
11 Differing ethnic compositions can result in the same Herfindahl index, so the white percentage
accounts for the relative importance of the white population in the calculation of the index.
12 Gentzkow (2006) assumes current DMA borders to be a valid approximation to those in the 1960s.
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number of TV stations and the amount of grants a county receives per capita. This bias
may go either way, depending on the direction of correlation of the omitted variable with
the endogenous regressor as well as with the dependent variable. A possible omitted factor
would be the presence of interest groups and lobbying activity, or to be more precise, the
presence of industries or groups of people that are well represented by interest groups. One
could think of the agricultural sector or heavy industry as branches that have traditionally
been successful in acquiring grants. Agricultural heavy counties tend to be rural, so often
they aren’t home to a TV station. Counties with heavy industry are located both in rural
areas as well as in urban surroundings. For rural industrial counties the same reasoning
as for agriculture applies. Urban counties with a higher share of heavy industry on the
other hand are probably not the kind of urban counties where TV stations tend to locate,
as they would rather emerge in a more service-industry oriented county in the same metro
area. Hence, the omission of lobbying activity would introduce a downward bias in the
OLS estimates.
A second issue we would like to address is measurement error in the number of TV
stations. Data on TV stations is obtained from the FCC and TV stations are assigned
to the county where the station is licensed or where the main transmitter is located. In
most cases this will be identical with the county where the actual TV studio is located
but sometimes the two locations do not coincide, causing the TV stations variable to be
measured with error. As is well known from the literature, measurement error biases OLS
estimates towards zero.
Finally, the location of TV stations may be endogenous to government spending, as they
include PBS affiliates, which are funded by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB,
which in turn is funded by the US federal government), federal and state governments
13. Because these stations may tend to emerge or be placed for political reasons where
spending is high, the use of OLS might lead us to overestimate the effect of having a TV
station in the home county. The same is true, if network TV stations emerge where a
large amount of grants is spent. This may happen, either because there is more to report
on in these places or because politicians influence the licensing process in some way14.
Hence, we instrument the number of TV stations and the first stage equation estimated
is:
φc = pi0 + pi1 · zc + pi2 · αc + pi3 · γc + pi4 · ψc + pi5 · kc + vc, (13)
where zc denotes the vector of instruments and the second stage is as in equation (12).
13 CPB grants to local jurisdictions are excluded from our dependent variable. Around 2000, PBS
received about $ 250 million per year from the CPB, $ 300 million from state governments, whereas
federal grants and contracts accounted for $ 70 million. See http://www.cpb.org or http://www.
newenglandfilm.com/news/archives/00december/pbs.htm
14 Prior (2006) argues that politicians have only rarely tried to influence the licensing process, though.
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We instrument the log TV station variable with two exogenous variables. The first is the
log of the number of TV sets in a given county in 1960. This should capture whether the
audience was large enough for a station to be interested in locating there or for the FCC to
grant a license to that city. The number of TV sets in 1960 is unlikely to be correlated with
either grants in 2000 or some underlying variable measuring inherent political interest,
as television did not serve as a major channel of distributing political information until
the mid 1960s (Roper 1985). This may be especially true for local news, as film or video
equipment, if at all available, was nowhere near as affordable as nowadays. The number
of TV sets is also unlikely to be related to lobbying activity. The second instrument is
the log of the number of low power (LP) TV stations that are not classified as Class-A
(CA) and have a broadcasting power of less than 10kw15. We argue that many of these
are local public access stations or other stations so low in reach and information content
(hence they are neither classified CA nor have significant broadcasting power) that they
cannot serve the governor in promoting her actions16. Thus, their location cannot be
contingent on public spending in county c or local voters’ interest in county c’s current
affairs. Their number is at the same time positively correlated with the number of full
service TV stations. One reason is that even small stations will employ people who are
trained in broadcasting and these people can be found in the media counties. In addition,
these small TV stations are no more or less likely to be located in a successful lobbying
county than in any other county.
3.3 Spatial Autocorrelation
There are good reasons to check for spatial dependencies in our data. Spatial autocorre-
lation induced by strategic interaction could be responsible for possible (dis-)similarities
between grants awarded to neighboring counties. One reason for suspecting such effects
is yardstick competition. We would then expect spending between neighbors to be pos-
itively correlated. As yardstick competition essentially requires two governments that
strategically interact, this may not be all that relevant in our setting, where the governor
decides on how to distribute grants across her state. Thus, when focusing on the gov-
ernor’s actions, grant spending in, say county A and B of the same state cannot be the
outcome of strategic interaction. It will rather be decided upon by a single person in order
to maximize the number of votes, taking into account voters’ reactions to a variation in
the allocation of grants. This implies that the Governor’s decisions are quite likely to
be driven to a large extent by measurable population characteristics rather than policy
15 CA stations are low power TV stations which are given protected status by the FCC because they
convey local information. We exclude stations above 10kw, because they might have a reach large
enough to make them an attractive outlet for politicians. The log is again calculated as (log of TV
stations +1).
16 Indeed, according to the National Association of Broadcasters, the total audience of low power
stations including Class A is 800,000 nationwide http://www.nab.org.
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interdependence17.
However, there may be other political agents such as the aforementioned congressmen
or elected county officials that make strategic interaction seem rather conceivable. In
addition, such strategic interaction can of course occur in counties bordering another
state. We already try to account for this fact by including the variable DMA home share
in our estimations. This variable measures the percentage of the population in a county’s
DMA living in the same state the county under consideration belongs to. The higher
the share living outside the home state, the more information about what is going on
in the other state we expect TV stations to convey, thus creating yardstick competition
among Governors. Even though we include this control and we do not feel the spatial
dependence in our setting to be an exclusively strategic one, in order to account for the
above mentioned effects, we estimate a spatial lag regression model which can be displayed
in matrix form as follows:
g = ρ Wg +Xβ + ε, (14)
where ε is a vector of i.i.d. error terms, g is a vector representing grant spending, W is
a spatial weight matrix, β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and Wg gives the
measure of grant spending in neighboring counties. The interaction between own and
neighbors’ spending is captured in the coefficient to be estimated, ρ, which we would then
expect to have a positive sign. Another reason for the choice of the spatial lag model
could be spillovers which we may not be able to capture in the baseline specification. In
this case, the spatial correlation, as expressed in ρ may point in either direction.
Another rationale for spatial correlation in our context would be locally correlated shocks
or the existence of spatially correlated omitted variables which drive the governor’s choice
of local spending. In both cases the spatial interdependence is relegated to the error term,
yielding the following spatial error model appropriate:
g = Xβ + ε (15)
ε = λWε+ u, (16)
where the notation differs from above in that ε is a vector of spatially autocorrelated error
terms, u is a vector of i.i.d. error terms and λ is the parameter measuring the extent of
spatial autocorrelation. We also estimate a specification that allows for the simultaneous
17 If people are envious of the amount of grants their neighboring counties receive, a sort of interde-
pendence would be introduced in that the Governor cannot distribute her funds unequally but must
rather follow up on a grant award to county A with an award to county B, thus creating positive
spatial autocorrelation.
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presence of spatial lag and error. Essentially this means estimating equation (14), where
the error term is as in equation (16), via a three step procedure that takes into account
the endogeneity of the spatially lagged variable18.
It must be pointed out that these models will be estimated as a robustness check rather
than as a means of determining what mechanism is responsible for possible spatial depen-
dencies. Our interest is mainly in determining whether the main media related variables
distance to media city and log number of TV stations pick up some of the spatial effects
and whether standard errors may be biased downwards in the OLS specification due to
the neglect of spatial effects.
3.4 Data Sources
The data mentioned above is gathered from a variety of sources. While the dependent
variable federal grants per capita is taken from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report
2000 (CFFR), many sociodemographic controls stem from the County Databook 2000,
published by the US Census Bureau. More sociodemographic controls are taken from the
database County Profiles published by the US Department of Agriculture19. The county
distances to the nearest media city are calculated based on the county population centroids
provided by the Census Bureau and the geographic location of media cities obtained by
using geocoding software. The names of DMAs and the media cities are those defined
by Nielsen Media Research for the year 2002. Counties are assigned to DMAs based on
the Nielsen definitions of the same year. The number of fully-licensed as well as low-
power TV stations by county is calculated using the Federal Bureau of Communications’
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Database as of July 2006. Unfortunately, we were
unable to obtain data for the actual time period under consideration, yet we believe
that given the little variation in the data over time mentioned above, this does not hurt
our results too much. The number of votes cast for Republican and Democrat party
in the presidential elections from 1980 to 1996 is taken from the USA Counties 1998
CD published by the US Census Bureau. This data was combined with the intercensal
population estimates (provided by the same source) in order to calculate vote shares of
the Republican and Democrat party in the presidential elections as well as voter turnout
and voter mobility (density). Finally, the number of television sets by county in 1960
is taken from the ICPSR County and City Data Book Consolidated File: County Data
1947-1977. Micropolitan areas are as of 2003, because this classification did not yet exist
in 2000. Summary statistics are displayed in table 1
18 Lag and error specification are estimated using maximum likelihood (ML), the combined spatial lag
and error model via the GS2LS estimator proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998). The weighting
matrix W is row standardized based on rook contiguity, i.e. counties sharing a common border are
treated as neighbors.
19 available online at http://maps.ers.usda.gov/profiles/webcensusdownload.aspx.
Figure 2: Counties by sample, darker shading marks metro/micro counties
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
grants per capita ($) 2934 1053 729 96 10937
grants per cap w/o Medicaid($) 2933 529 582 −224 9986
full service tv stations 2934 0.51 1.43 0 21
distance to media city ratio 2934 100.98 56.69 0.66 336
Median income 1997 ($) 2934 32461 7900 14178 77513
bachelor or higher pct 2934 13.19 6.28 3.7 53.4
out of state county 2934 0.146 0.353 0 1
DMA share in home state 2934 78.25 30.38 0.07 100
native american pct 2934 1.49 5.42 0 86
poverty pct 2934 15.00 6.22 1.9 46.7
high school dropout pct 2934 30.69 10.23 4.5 68.4
under 24 yrs pct 2934 34.33 4.28 20.2 66
unemployed pct 2934 4.75 2.52 0.7 27.6
bank deposits per cap (1000$) 2934 11.40 5.90 0.84 108.63
female pct 2934 50.47 1.85 32.74 57.43
expenditure per cap (1000$) 2934 2.24 0.864 0.017 10.47
mean to median income 2934 1.67 0.27 0.79 10.12
white pct 2934 85.16 15.59 12.60 99.50
ethnic fragmentation 2934 0.75 0.18 0.26 0.99
distance to capital ratio 2934 100.01 54.0 4 362
fed gov employed pct 2934 0.69 1.22 0.04 37.24
other gov employed pct 2934 6.56 2.83 2.24 52.52
turnout ratio 1996 2934 0.99 0.13 0.16 1.85
voter density 2934 0.72 0.83 0 3
metro/micro indicator 2934 0.56 0.49 0 1
population density (1000/sqm) 2934 0.165 0.639 0.0002 16.398
land area (1000 sqm) 2934 0.955 1.290 0.015 20.053
population (100,000s) 2934 0.838 2.819 0.005 95.193
low power tv stations 2934 1.69 5.23 0 70
tv sets 1960 2930 13618 55457 139 1816565
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Link between media activity and spending
We employ two samples in estimating our model: a full sample of counties, containing 2934
observations and a subset containing all 1652 micropolitan and metropolitan counties in
the dataset (Figure 2 shows counties by sample, where Metro/Micro counties are nested
within the full sample20). Note that all counties containing the state capitals (n = 48)
have been excluded from the analysis as some grants that cannot be attributed to a single
county are assigned to the state capital and including these counties would likely lead us
to overestimate the effect of the media on grant spending.
The main reason for splitting up our sample is that rural and nonrural counties may not
be comparable because rural counties receive more grants per capita due to effects we may
not be able to control for. These include scale effects, minimum grants per county leading
to higher per capita grants in less populous counties, overrepresentation in the political
process or flat rate grants per county. Even though we control for a number of urbanity
measures such as metro/micro classification, ethnic fractionalization, population density
and population, we want to rule out the possibility of measuring urban-rural differences
in grant spending in our media variables. Descriptive statistics in tables 2, 3 and 4 show
20 Metro areas are defined by the Bureau of the Census as areas containing a core urban area of 50,000
or more population. Micropolitan areas contain an urban core of at least 10,000 population. Metro
or micro areas include one or more counties, specifically the core urban area, as well as many adjacent
counties. Around 80% of the US population resides in metropolitan areas.
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that:
(a) distance ratios are largest in the full sample, implying large distance ratios on rural
counties,
(b) the raw correlation between grants and distance is higher in the full sample than in the
Metro/Micro sample (this holds if we exclude Medicaid grants. We will exclude Medicaid
later on as a robustness check) and
(c) rural counties indeed receive larger amounts of grants per capita. We take this as a
hint, that the relationship probably differs across samples.
Table 2: Mean distance ratio to nearest media city.
N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Full sample 2934 100.98 56.69 0.66 336.08
Metro/Micro 1652 79.94 53.72 0.66 336.08
Table 3: Raw correlations grants/distance, grants/tv stations.
incl. Medicaid excl. Medicaid
Full sample Metro micro Full sample Metro micro
Grants/Distance 0.156 0.053 0.058 −0.032
Grants/TV stations −0.024 0.074 0.021 0.112
N 2934 1652 2933 1651
Table 4: Mean grants per capita.
N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Full sample Medicaid 2934 1053.03 729.09 96.27 10937.44
Metro/Micro Medicaid 1652 896.28 523.34 96.27 7404.66
Full sample no Medicaid 2933 529.64 582.07 −224.37 9986.81
Metro/Micro no Medicaid 1651 470.17 386.37 −224.37 7210.87
Counties with negative values of grants per capita without Medicaid (n = 5) are excluded from the
estimations. All results remain unaltered when a transformation is applied that allows logs to be taken
(and the counties are included).
One reason as to why a log-log model could be in order is that the effect of distance may
diminish with increasing distance (i.e. expenses are incurred whenever news happens
farther away, whether the production team travels 50 or 100 miles doesn’t really matter).
In this specification, a negative coefficient on distance indicates a negative but leveling off
relationship. In a similar vein, increases in the number of TV stations may yield decreasing
gains in grants, as the effect of the first and second (i.e. introduction of competition) TV
station certainly differs from the influence of the tenth station.
Full sample results of the OLS regressions using the number of TV stations as our measure
of media coverage are shown in table 5. Column (1) displays coefficients using population
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controls only. Column (2) adds income, Column (3) uses the full set of controls and
Column (4) adds an interaction between DMA home share and the out-of-state indicator.
Having TV stations in the county leads to higher grant awards, yet the effect decreases in
the number of stations. As mentioned above, the elasticity can be calculated as β · [x/(x+
1)], accordingly the loss of the only TV station in a county incurs a drop in grants per
capita of approximately 1.9% whereas an increase from 10 to 11 stations only generates
[10 · 10/11] · 0.038 = 0.35% more grants per capita. Somewhat surprising is, that a higher
home state share in county i’s DMA leads to lower grant awards, yet it is consistent with
the idea of yardstick competition. The sign on out-of-state counties is as expected, yet
insignificant. When the interaction is introduced, the effect of being out-of-state is -12%.
Keep in mind, though, that this is evaluated at a DMA home share of zero. For out of
state counties, an increase in the home share is associated with a gain in grants, whereas
in state counties lose money when their DMA home share increases. Considering that
the average DMA home share for out-of-state counties is 20% as opposed to 88% for the
in-state counties, this could mean that a county that has no media city in its home state
can make up for this disadvantage by its state’s DMA home share being larger (i.e. being
relatively more important). As for the in-state counties the negative coefficient on home
share implies that given that there is a media city in your state it is best shared with as
few people as possible, which would also mean a positive media effect on grants.
Finally, most of the political and socio-economic variables are significant and have the
expected signs.
The results obtained when distance to the nearest media city is employed as our measure
of media activity are displayed in table 6. Again, the estimation results are consistent with
our theoretical predictions. The coefficient on distance is highly significant and predicts
that a county located twice as far away from the nearest media city as the average county
in the DMA receives 3.4% less in grants per capita. All the other variables’ coefficients
resemble those in table 5.
Next, we consider the Metro/Micro subsamples (Table 7 reports the coefficients on the
media variables, where columns (1)-(4) indicate the same specifications as in tables 5 and
6. The full specifications can be found in the appendix, tables 12 and 13). Once more,
there is a highly significant effect of number of media activity on grants received. Within
this urban sample, the effects of distance and harboring a TV station roughly match the
results we found before. The magnitude of the coefficients differs only by around 10%
between the samples
In sum, we find the hypothesized effect of our key variables in both samples, leading us to
conclude that counties less exposed to media coverage receive less attention when grants
are distributed. We take this as evidence that a vote-maximizing politicians’ rationale
does favor counties where media activity is high.
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Table 7: Dependent variable is (log of) grants (per cap). OLS estimates metro/micro
sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log distance −0.0188 −0.0716∗∗∗ −0.0333∗∗∗ −0.0319∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
N 1691 1691 1652 1652
log tv stations 0.0514∗ 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
N 1691 1691 1652 1652
Specifications (1) to (4) are as in the full sample estimations. Only counties that belong to a metropolitan
or micropolitan area are included. All state capital counties (n=48) excluded from the estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by state. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
4.2 2SLS results
In this section we address the possibility that TV station location is a function of grant
spending or that TV station location as well as grant spending are influenced by some
underlying variable in the error term. The reasoning for our instruments has been laid out
in 3.2, table 8 shows some first stage statistics. Both instruments are highly correlated
with the number of full service TV stations, standard overidentification tests fail to reject
instrument exogeneity at conventional levels.
Table 9 displays the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results. In the full sample
(1), the coefficient of having a TV station is much higher than in the OLS estimations and
thus suggests that we largely underestimated the effect of having one or more television
stations at virtually zero distance. The coefficient of 0.33 means that the loss of the only
TV station leads to a cut in grants by around 16% while an increase from 10 to 11 stations
leads to a gain of 3% in federal funding.
Things are similar in the Metro/Micro sample (2), where the coefficient on TV stations
is of the expected sign, yet smaller than in the full sample.
A few words on the magnitude of the coefficients are in order. The effect of TV stations
is several times larger in 2SLS than in OLS. This in itself does not mean we cannot trust
these results. After all, as the earlier examples show, the losses generated by a shutdown
of a county’s sole TV station would then be below twenty percent. We do not consider
this to be an implausible effect. In any event, the instrumental variables corroborate the
OLS results and suggest that the OLS estimates may be considered as a lower bound of
the media effect.
4.3 Robustness checks
Having established a positive influence of media activity on grant spending, this section
is concerned with how robust these results are to changes in specification and sample.
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Table 8: First stage statistics. Dependent variable is (log of) tv stations.
Full sample Metro Micro sample
log low power tv stations 0.075∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.024)
log tv sets 1960 0.180∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.229∗∗∗ (0.019)
F(2,47) 80.59 (p = 0.000) 98.61 (p = 0.000)
adj. R2 0.288 0.285
partial adj. R2 0.088 0.119
N 2930 1650
Estimates are for 2nd stage dependent variable (log of) grants per capita. Results when (log of) grants per
capita excluding Medicaid is employed are not reported as the samples only differ by two observations and
results are virtually the same. All state capital counties (n=48) excluded from the estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses allow for clustering by state. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 9: Dependent variable is (log of) grants per capita. 2SLS estimates.
(1) (2)
Full sample Metro micro sample
log tv stations 0.3388∗∗∗ (0.066) 0.2330∗∗∗ (0.057)
log income −0.8160∗∗∗ (0.133) −0.7486∗∗∗ (0.173)
bachelor or higher 0.0119∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.0090∗ (0.005)
out of state county −0.1072∗ (0.058) −0.1217∗ (0.068)
DMA share in home state −0.0021∗∗ (0.001) −0.0019∗∗∗ (0.001)
out of state X DMA share 0.0034∗∗ (0.002) 0.0050∗∗∗ (0.002)
native american pct 0.0032 (0.002) 0.0052 (0.003)
poverty pct 0.0286∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.0387∗∗∗ (0.006)
high school dropout pct 0.0170∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.0157∗∗∗ (0.004)
under 24 yrs pct −0.0229∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.0213∗∗∗ (0.006)
unemployed pct 0.0021 (0.007) −0.0141∗ (0.007)
log bank deposits 0.0515 (0.033) 0.0513 (0.043)
female pct 0.0158∗∗ (0.007) 0.0239∗∗∗ (0.008)
logexpenditures pc −0.0032 (0.040) 0.0140 (0.040)
mean to median income 0.0887∗∗ (0.037) 0.1154∗∗ (0.053)
white pct −0.0034∗∗ (0.001) −0.0031∗∗ (0.002)
ethnic fragmentation −0.3137∗∗ (0.139) −0.3234∗∗ (0.134)
logdistance to capital −0.0532∗ (0.031) −0.0618∗∗∗ (0.022)
fed gov employed pct 0.0210∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.0470∗∗∗ (0.009)
other gov employed pct 0.0268∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.0280∗∗∗ (0.009)
log turnout ratio 1996 0.1779 (0.176) 0.3345∗ (0.179)
log voter density 0.0799∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.0584∗∗ (0.028)
metro/micro −0.0542∗∗ (0.027)
population density (1000s) 0.0337 (0.023) 0.0258 (0.017)
population (100000s) −0.0160∗∗ (0.006) −0.0098 (0.006)
intercept 13.7499 (1.766) 11.8740 (1.825)
state fixed effects Yes Yes
N 2930 1650
adj. R2 0.527 0.585
test of overid. restr. χ2(1) 0.530 (p = 0.466) 1.715 (p = 0.183)
All state capital counties (n=48) excluded from the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses allow for
clustering by state.
∗
p < 0.10,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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As we have mentioned before, all estimations so far have excluded the 48 state capital
counties because some grant monies are attributed to them when the actual distribution
across the state is unknown. As table 14 in the Appendix shows, with capital counties
included, the effects are far stronger, in some specifications even twice as large as without
capital counties, thus excluding these jurisdictions seems reasonable.
In a second test, we excluded Medicaid spending from the grants variable. Medicaid
accounts for roughly half the federal grant money in our data and is also considered to
be rather “fixed” (Levitt and Snyder 1997). Excluding these payments is an implicit
test of whether our media variables pick up health status in the population or some
other characteristic we have not controlled for. In three of our four OLS specifications
the estimated media effects are now at least 20% larger than before (Table 15 in the
appendix), whereas the effect of TV stations is about 10% lower in the full sample when
Medicaid is excluded. The larger effects are in line with what we would expect if Medicaid
cannot be influenced by political agents as much as other grant schemes. The fact that
the coefficient actually decreases in the TV full sample weakens this argument somewhat,
yet the hypothesized effects put forward in the earlier sections of the paper are still very
much present and in three out of four cases even strengthened.
4.4 Spatial regression results
Checking whether our results are contaminated by spatial effects, we find that they do
not change as much as one might expect, even though we do find highly significant spatial
correlation. Most importantly, both our media variables remain virtually unaltered in
comparison to the OLS results. Table 10 displays the coefficients on the media variables,
spatial error (λ) and spatial lag (ρ) estimates as well as test statistics. Estimations are
carried out on the full sample only.
Table 10: Spatial ML and GS2SLS estimations.
log tv stations log distance
ML-lag ML-error GS2SLS ML-lag ML-error GS2SLS
log tv stations 0.036∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
log distance −0.034∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ρ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.032)
λ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.050∗
robust LM (error) 03.81∗ 03.65∗
robust LM (lag) 09.53∗∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗
LR test 51.06∗∗∗ 49.09∗∗∗ 52.20∗∗∗ 49.44∗∗∗
N 2934 2934 2934 2934 2934 2934
The number of TV stations remains highly significant in both the lag and the error
specification. The robust LM multipliers however favor the lag model21. We find highly
21 The robust multipliers test for significance of the spatial error parameter in the presence of a spatial
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significant positive spatial correlation in both models, yet the inclusion of the spatial
parameters leaves the effect of TV stations unchanged in the lag and the error model.
Because the presence of spatial error cannot be rejected in the lag model and vice versa
(see the robust LM tests), estimation of a combined spatial lag and error model is in order.
As mentioned earlier, we apply the three step spatial-IV estimator (GS2SLS) suggested
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998). The results for this GS2SLS estimator once again indicate
that the media effect does not pick up spatial autocorrelation22
Things are not very different in the case of the distance to media center variable. Again,
the lag specification is preferred over the spatial error model. The robust LM multipliers
indicate significant lag effects in the presence of spatially correlated error terms and vice
versa, so the GS2SLS procedure again seems to be the best fit for our data. The negative
effect of distance is about the same as in OLS in all three models.
As was explained earlier, the discussion as to what the factors underlying the spatial
correlation are is beyond the scope of this paper, so we are content with being able to
state that the significance in both media activity variables cannot be an artefact of spatial
dependencies.
5 Conclusion
This paper set out to analyze the effects of geographical distance from media outlets on
federal grant spending. We found strong support for our theoretical predictions in the
measure of distance to media outlets and media density combined, the number of TV
stations. The effect of distance to the nearest media city is in the hypothesized direction
in both samples as well. Neither of these effects is confounded with spatial dependencies.
Endogeneity on the other hand seems to be a problem when it comes to estimating the
effect of the number of TV stations on grants received. We massively underestimate
the coefficient in the OLS specifications. Even if one were to doubt the validity of our
instruments, the direction of the effect is in the hypothesized direction in OLS, albeit
of smaller magnitude. Still, at a rate of approximately $1,000 per capita even a gain or
loss of around 2% in grants per capita amounts to a large sum for a county harboring,
say, 100,000 inhabitants, not to speak of the effects estimated via 2SLS. Being located
far away from the media center leads to lower grants as well, yet the effect seems to be
somewhat smaller, considering that most counties aren’t located farther than twice the
average distance from the nearest media center. It doesn’t matter, however, which effect
is stronger, as both measure distance to media outlets (with the number of TV stations
measuring an additional effect of media density). In terms of robustness and magnitude
our results strongly suggest that the intensity of media activity matters to politicians and
lag parameter (Robust LM (error)) and vice versa (Robust LM (lag)).
22 As suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1998), we use the full set of spatially-first-lagged exogenous
variables as instruments to account for the endogeneity of the spatial lag.
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influences the geographical distribution of federal grants.
We did not try to uncover the reasons for the highly significant spatial effects. As stated
earlier, apart from spatially correlated shocks or omitted variables that take on similar
values in neighboring counties, the rationale for suspecting such effects could be either
yardstick competition or spillovers in the provision of public goods.
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6 Appendix
Table 11: Counties by number of full power TV stations (including Class A).
Full sample Metro micro sample
number of TV stations Frequency pct Frequency pct
0 2, 284 77.85 1, 123 67.98
1 359 12.24 258 15.62
2 115 3.92 102 6.17
3 51 1.74 46 2.78
4 45 1.53 43 2.60
5 31 1.06 31 1.88
6 13 0.44 13 0.79
7 12 0.41 12 0.73
8 5 0.17 5 0.30
9 6 0.20 6 0.36
10 4 0.14 4 0.24
11 2 0.07 2 0.12
12 1 0.03 1 0.06
13 4 0.14 4 0.24
16 1 0.03 1 0.06
21 1 0.03 1 0.06
Total 2, 934 100.00 1652 100.00
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Table 14: Sample including state capitals. Dependent variable is (log of) grants (per
capita).
Medicaid included Medicaid excluded
Distance TV Distance TV
OLS full sample −0.044∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018)
2SLS full sample 0.389∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.087)
OLS metro/micro −0.040∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
2SLS metro/micro 0.275∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.071)
All state capital counties (n=48) included in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses allow for
clustering by state. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 15: Dependent variable is (log of) grants (per capita) excluding Medicaid.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance TV Overid First F(2,47)
OLS full sample −0.043∗∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.010) (0.017)
2SLS full sample 0.369∗∗∗ 0.096 78.01
(0.097) (p = 0.755) (p = 0.000)
OLS metro/micro −0.041∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.013) (0.017)
2SLS metro/micro 0.312∗∗∗ 1.550 95.35
(0.080) (p = 0.213) (p = 0.000)
Column (1) displays coefficients on media variable (log of) distance, column (2) for media variable (log
of) tv stations. Columns (3) and (4) show tests of overidentifying restrictions and first stage F values.
All state capital counties (n=48) excluded from the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses allow for
clustering by state. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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